Philosophy, so conceived, is a complex and many-sided project that addresses issues of profound human concern. Granted, no one person can manage to master or indeed even begin to answer all of its questions adequately. But one should never take the stance that the sectors outside one’s sphere of interest don’t really matter. And if the task is too big—if mastery of the whole is impracticable—then one can at least strive for a rudimentary understanding of the whole range of component issues and to have a clear understanding of at least one sector of the field. The philosopher cannot afford to be either a hedgehog who knows a small terrain well but is ignorant of the larger setting nor yet a fox who knows superficially a wide area but no one part of it thoroughly. Instead philosophers worthy of the name must try to the best of their ability to be a bit of both.
PHILOSOPHICAL ERROR
Insofar as we are benevolent and wish for people the best that life has to offer, we would undoubtedly want them to have knowledge, virtue, and happiness, that is we would want them to be wise, good, and contented. And insofar as philosophy is to be “the guide to life,” its function is to foster the understanding needed for the sensible pursuit of these goals.
In this light the first and most profound error of philosophizing is to see the subject in misguided terms with purposes apart from those that constituted its definitive aims.
In particular, it would be inaccurate to think that philosophy aims at presenting the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. That testimonial oath would be going too far. But what one can say is that philosophy aims in this general direction—that it tries to present the main aspects of the truth, insofar as this is needful and practicable, and in doing so that it seeks to avoid any outright falsification. In the circumstances, such a diminution of aspirations is only right and proper.
Even so, no-one ever said that the work of a philosopher is easy. On route to philosophical understanding there are a virtually endless ways of getting off the track. This alone would explain why it is hard to find a systematic inventory of them philosophical mistakes. Still, it is clear that there will have to be three major categories of defects in philosophical exposition: * Errors of Commission * Errors of Omission * Errors of Transmission
Philosophical deliberations cannot afford such errors, seeing that its aim is to secure rational conviction and that all such mis-steps are obstacles that stand in the way. After all, philosophizing is (inter alia) a venture in cognitive inquiry and all of these involve violations of rational cogency.
To be sure, the avoidance of error is not a be-all and end-all, the way to philosophical understanding does not lie in the avoidance of errors alone. This desideratum may be a necessary condition for good philosophizing, but it is certainly not sufficient. All the same, it is a key point of a larger picture, and it is worthwhile to take a closer look at what it involves.
ERRORS OF COMMISSION
Of the innumerable flaws of commission that can blemish a philosophical exposition, some stand in the foreground.
- Inconsistency/Incoherence
- Implausibility/Stretching Credibility
- Probative Deficiency
- Oversimplification
- Overreaching
- Fallacy
- Trivial Pursuit: Misemphasis
Let us consider these somewhat more closely.
Inconsistency. Logical coherence is an indispensable requisite. One cannot appropriately say in one place that what affirms of entails P and in another that what affirms or entails not-P. There would be no clearer sign of a failure to think seriously and sensibly about the issues.
Implausibility. A credible body of philosophizing cannot stretch our credulity beyond reasonable limits. In particular its theories and speculations cannot or should not combine our basic cognitive commitments. In particular, philosophy must not conflict with the basic facts that comprise our pre-philosophical cognition, and accordingly must not contravene
- logical fundamentals
- scientific fact
- everyday knowledge
- common sense
Refutation by reductio ad absurdum hold good in philosophy as elsewhere. What is being contended must not entail absurd consequences—be it individually or on conjunction with well-established fact. A philosophy that denies craters on the moon or tea in China is not worth the paper it is printed on.
Philosophizing is (or should be) a serious business. A philosopher’s views merit attention because of their constructive viewing on the issues, not because those views are bizarre let alone outrageous. The motto Credo quia absurdum may have some merit for the theologian, but is improper for the philosopher.
Probative Deficiency. Inadequate substantiation is a crucial defense. The reason for being of philosophical discourse is to secure account. And one cannot expect to achieve this in the absence of providing a plausible substantiation for one’s claims. One’s contentions should be presented in an environment that renders the at least plausible and at best compelling. Often we must of course maintain conclusions that go beyond the securely known premises at our disposal. (We could not otherwise reason “individuality.”) But of course the extent to which such premiss-transcending leaps of our conjecture are appropriate is decidedly limited. The philosopher may not be able to demonstrate his contentions with mathematical cogency. But he should not forget them extensively with contention that have no visible means of support. The philosopher should not overreach and presume too much for his audience by way of uncritically generous concession.
(excerpted from introduction)
