The Case for Parental Choice

Why does the state appoint professional strangers—the “public” school—to conscript the child of our poor and worker families to serve 180 days a year for thirteen years in three or more state schools that his mother would have shunned, if only she had the resources either to better her residence or to pay private tuition? Why does American law—unlike most of Europe—impose what we mislabel a “public” school upon such families when, instead, the state could deploy these same resources to honor family preferences in the manner of the middle class?

This observer has grown old and boring striving to answer this question. I have on occasion promoted parental choice politically, but primarily by writing books (with the admirable Stephen Sugarman) and essays of the kind in this collection. I am deeply grateful for Notre Dame Press for making this volume possible.

There is a multitude of justifications that I have heard offered for our government school system that musters the child of the poor like a draftee meanwhile allowing those of sufficient resources the parents’ preferences. I will try to suggest the diverse nature of these apologies. Some are devices of special interest such as the educational bureaucracy and the teachers’ union who would maximize clientele. There are, as well, unspoken but evident convictions among some educators and residents in high income districts that there are profound civic and social differences in the families of the slum that make their separation necessary; I suppose this too is a form of special interest. In any case, none of them seem as “justification” in any moral sense; they are merely empirical-political explanations for the systemic frustration of parental choice for the underclass.

There are other defenses of the system that are morally more plausible, and which deserve to be addressed. Some are sotto voce. There are honest and generous folk who believe the poor are simply unready as a class to choose a school for their own child; they would merely do damage to both the child and the civil order. Montaigne complained that some governments leave the child’s case and education “to the mercy of parents, let them be as foolish and ill-conditioned as they may, without any manner of discretion” suppose this is plausible; the next question then becomes: over time would the experience of exercising the responsibility of choosing to contribute to the general capacity of the parent-citizen? And next, if so, can society abide the effects of inevitable parental mistakes whole awaiting this presumed civic payoff?

Another legitimate concern: perhaps our historic conscription of the lower-class child by the professional stranger is expected to maximize intelligence as portrayed by test scores. There is much ado about this question. So far, the evidence suggests the opposite. Parental choice seems to help at least a bit in promoting the measurable intellectual growth of the child. It is a better device than the systematic randomness of coercive assignment by home address.

But maybe compulsory assignment to a state school best enhances the ultimate civility of the graduate—more than does choice by pauperized mothers. Essays that follow will suggest the opposite.

Still another plausible justification: compulsory assignment of the poor is an aid to racial integration. Are assigned schools in fact, then, less racially segregated than those freely chosen by the parent? The supporting evidence for this claim is thin and getting thinner. The author’s own experience as an attorney seeking integration in a large urban district under court order was disheartening; private schools of various sects (and none) formally offered thousands of integrating spaces for parental choice. The district (Kansas City) refused the invitation. School districts that survive by conscription seem today to be desegregating.

Is choice for the non-rich too costly in dollars, as opponents often claim? The evidence seems strongly the other way. Charter schools, tax credits, and voucher programs can be designed either to increase or decrease the net cost to the taxpayers. This is a complex and technical question, and much would depend upon the design of a system; but, if fiscal control is an object, choice is compatible.