What makes this theory distinct – and enables it to provide what I consider the best account of ethics currently available – is that it coherently integrates three elements which all have a place in common sense morality, but which tend to be isolated from one another in contemporary utilitarian, Kantian, or virtue theories. Those three elements are, in brief: goods, norms and virtues. New Natural Law (NNL) theorists recognize that ethics is ultimately about promoting and respecting human flourishing – capturing what I believe to be the basic intuition that makes utilitarianism attractive, but offering a vision of the human good that is much more varied and substantive than the one offered by most utilitarians (who tend to reduce the good to pleasure or preference satisfaction). Like Kantians (and unlike utilitarians), NNLT recognizes that morality is fundamentally about having a good will, that having a good will has something to do with respecting all persons, and that the requirements of respect for persons limit (in some respects absolutely and without exception) what it is morally permissible to choose and do. Yet by contrast with Kantianism, what rectifies the will on the natural law view is not a formal categorical imperative with no direct connection to a substantive account of human flourishing. Rather, what rectifies the will on the NNL account is precisely the ideal of integral human flourishing, the all-around flourishing of all human beings within a harmonious community. Thus there is an inherent connection between NNLT’s account of the human good – of the perfection of human nature – and its account of moral norms. Finally, like virtue ethics, the theory is agent-centered, recognizing the way in which choices and actions shape the character of the agent, and also offering an account of why virtue is necessary for the ability to make sound moral judgments and act upon them. Yet unlike most contemporary virtue ethicists, NNL theorists explicitly integrate virtues with an objective account of the human good, and related moral principles. (Such an integration is arguably implicit in Aquinas and in the work of many other contemporary Thomists, but I believe that NNLT offers the most explicit account of this integration.)
Particularly for the sake of readers who consider themselves Thomists and who approach NNLT with suspicion, it is worth noting here that my acceptance of the theory was a long and slow process. For – like perhaps many of you – I first heard about the theory from its critics, and before actually encountering NNLT directly, I had spent a lot of time (particularly during my graduate studies at the Pontifical University of the Holy Cross in Rome) steeped in the study of Aristotle and Aquinas. I was also drawn particularly to Alasdair MacIntyre’s interpretation and development of the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. As a result, the first time I actually read something by an NNL theorist – John Finnis’s Natural Law and Natural Rights – I found the language and approach off-putting and confusing, quite different from what I had become accustomed to during my studies in Rome. Primed to be suspicious of the theory, I confess that I did not at first read the book with a truly open mind, but instead read it looking for evidence to confirm the criticisms I had been taught. I still learned a great deal from the book even in that first reading, and agreed with much of it, but nonetheless I believed that I had found the “evidence” I was looking for and considered my basic suspicions confirmed.
Thankfully, my encounter with NNLT went beyond passing exposure in a graduate course. Working under Robert George at Princeton, I had the great good fortune to be invited to meetings at which NNL thinkers (often together with friendly critics) gathered to discuss various philosophical issues. I never hesitated to voice my criticisms and concerns at these meetings, and my comments were always welcomed and taken seriously. Over the course of several years, the dialogues I had with NNL theorists during these meetings slowly clarified and corrected my many misconceptions, until eventually I came to realize that that my concerns about the theory had been resolved, and thus became convinced of the theory’s fundamental soundness.
I relate this philosophical conversion story because I see one of the purposes of this book as articulating NNLT in a way that can help to clarify some of the misconceptions that I believe underlie many if not most of the criticisms raised by those who consider themselves traditional Thomists. At the same time, the story is a reminder that we all approach philosophical arguments with certain biases that can lead us to misinterpret or prematurely dismiss them, and that while authors have the responsibility to try to articulate their positions as clearly as possible, readers have the responsibility to consider those positions and the arguments for them with a genuinely open mind.
This book is, at any rate, not just for those who are already attracted to the Aristotelian-Thomistic approach to ethics, which unfortunately remains somewhat of an outlier in the contemporary academy. It is, rather, for anyone looking for a “common sense” moral theory that can overcome the deontology-consequentialism dichotomy, recognizing the intrinsic connection between morality and human flourishing while also accounting for the existence of moral absolutes and the importance of moral character. It is also for those in the academy who are currently convinced of deontology or consequentialism but are willing to consider an alternative viewpoint with an open mind, or who perhaps simply want to be able to offer an alternative viewpoint to their students. And since ethics is not merely an academic subject but is of vital importance to every human being – for I believe that our flourishing as individuals and communities depends upon whether our choices and actions are in line with moral truth – I hope that my presentation of NNLT in this book will be a helpful resource for non-academics seeking deeper answers to fundamental moral questions. With that end in mind, I have tried to present my claims and arguments in ways that, while rigorous, avoid unnecessary academic jargon and save most of the technical scholarly engagement for the footnotes. Those uninterested in the details of scholarly disputes will thus find that the main text offers a clean presentation of the theory, while academics and others interested in these disputes will find their scholarly questions attended to in the footnotes.
(excerpted from introduction)
