American Presidents in Diplomacy and War chronicles the major foreign policy crises faced by twelve American presidents in order to uncover the reoccurring patterns of successful and less successful uses of diplomatic, economic, and military power. In this brief and highly readable book, Thomas R. Parker reveals how America’s most successful leaders manage events instead of allowing events to control them.
Our studies of presidential foreign policy have illustrated some of the principles and recurring patterns of effective statecraft. These include the need to understand first the complexity of issues, including the motivations and capabilities of other parties and the stakes for one’s own country. Prudent leaders then examine the various policy options, including their pros and cons. Leaders and their advisors must also draw relevant lessons from the past, including from their own mistakes, adapt to changing circumstances in the present and anticipate future developments, including how other countries are likely to react to America’s actions. Finally, as noted, determination does not guarantee success, but its absence will usually result in failure.
Our historical cases demonstrate that many of America’s leading presidents were adept at understanding complex situations. Washington and Hamilton understood the motivations and goals of the European powers. They worked with France during the American Revolution without encouraging its return to Canada and remained neutral during the 1790s wars of the French Revolution. Lincoln learned quickly about the nuances of European diplomacy, an unfamiliar subject. The two Roosevelts, who knew Europe and its languages from travel, understood the motivations of the European and Asian powers. Nixon, unlike most observes, felt that the Middle East was heading towards war in 1973 and accurately anticipated its likely evolution. Secretary of State Kissinger navigated skillfully among the region’s powers during the war and the subsequent negotiations. President George H. Bush quickly concluded that economic sanctions would not force Iraqi President Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait; he understood the oil market better than his advisors did.
Our historical cases also show that the presidents we consider successful were generally prudent in their policy choices. Washington made a point of asking his generals and civilian advisors for their advice about all key decisions, and he supported the unpopular Jay Treaty to avoid being dragged into a war with England. Lincoln wisely accepted the advice of Secretary of State Seward to postpone the Emancipation Proclamation until the North had achieved some military success, but rejected Secretary of the Navy Gideon Wells’ counsel to challenge Britain’s maritime policies at the risk of hostilities. As a mediator, Theodore Roosevelt helped to cajole the Kaiser into backing down in Morocco in 1905 and to foster a rough balance of power between Japan and Russia in Asia. Franklin Roosevelt used guile and obfuscation to nudge the U.S. towards supporting Britain and France against Germany and Italy without getting too far out in front of Congress and public opinion. These presidents were all deliberative in their decision-making, examining policy options carefully.
Yet their prudence could also include assertive choices, even audacity. Franklin Roosevelt supported Churchill’s decision to bomb the French fleet in 1940 to preclude it from falling under German control. Nixon approved placing U.S. military force on a high military alert status to deter Soviet intervention in the 1973 war. President George H. Bush mobilized much of the U.S. military to expel Iraq from Kuwait. Lincoln fired a succession of generals until he found Grant.
Several presidents displayed the ability to learn, to adapt, and to anticipate. Washington learned, however reluctantly, that his colonial militia could not stand up to professional British soldiers on the field of battle; he subsequently adopted a guerrilla war strategy. Theodore Roosevelt came to believe that the U.S. should not have taken the Philippines from Spain since the U.S. did not want to commit the resources to defend them against Japan, assuming that such an increased commitment would have even worked. Roosevelt did not have the political power to grant the Philippines their independence, but the experience did contribute to his growth as president and the need to match ends with means. Nixon and Kissinger demonstrated the ability to adapt quickly to changing circumstances in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, first siding with Israel, then with Egypt.
All of these presidents often were able to anticipate future events. Washington was wary about allying too closely with France during the American Revolution for fear of having another European power as its neighbor. Lincoln feared that aggressive maritime diplomacy could lead to war with England. Theodore Roosevelt anticipated the dangers of German, Russian and Japanese aggression against U.S. interests. Franklin Roosevelt prepared the public and Congress and the U.S. military itself for possible wars in Europe and Asia.
Did any worldview unite these historic figures? Washington and Hamilton were comfortable with the traditional balance of power European approach to foreign policy, whereby concrete national interests were the highest priority. While they believed that the United States represented a noble republican experiment that showed that larger numbers of citizens, as compared to Europe, would govern themselves, they also felt America’s foreign policy would be conducted largely in the way of the European states. As noted, the word most often used in the Farwell Address is “interest,” not freedom, liberty, or ideals. As Hamilton’s biographer put it: “Unlike Jefferson, Hamilton never saw the creation of America as a magical leap across a chasm to an entirely new landscape, and he always thought the New World had much to learn from the Old.”