Political polarization is traditionally viewed as the result of competing left/right ideologies. In The Authoritarian Divide: Populism, Propaganda, and Polarization, Orçun Selçuk argues that, regardless of ideology, polarization is driven by dominant populist leaders who deliberately divide constituents by cultivating a dichotomy of inclusion and exclusion. Drawing on multiple qualitative and quantitative methodologies for support, as well as content from propaganda media such as public speeches, Muhtar Meetings, Aló Presidente, and Enlace Ciudadano, Selçuk details and analyzes the tactics used by three well-known populist leaders to fuel affective leader polarization: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, and Rafael Correa in Ecuador.
Chávez’s symbolic populist appeal derives from his authenticity and closeness to the average people. Throughout his political career, Chávez portrayed himself as the true representative of “the glorious,” “warrior,” “poetic,” “heroic,” “noble,” “dignified,” and “brave people of Venezuela” (Episodes #1, 8, and 71). As a patriotic soldier who was “in love with Venezuela’s diverse topography of rivers, islands, jungles, and mountains,” Chávez often talked about his humble origins from the rural heartland of the country that is known as the Great Savannas (Episode #1). In his weekly TV show, Aló Presidente, Chávez not only made the case that he was the first president who listened to the people and engaged in direct conversations with them but who also showcased “the forgotten parts of the country” that are geographically and spatially distant from the capital city Caracas. Even his biggest critics would acknowledge this charismatic appeal that distinguished Chávez from the traditional political elite in the country and helped him become the most well-known populist leader in Latin America since Juan Domingo Perón in Argentina.
The Venezuelan public first met Chávez in 1992, during a coup attempt that was led by the Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement (MBR-200). The MBR-200 was a clandestine organization within the military, whose members searched for alternative paths for Venezuela that were centered around nationalism and leftism. The movement drew heavily from Simón Bolívar as well as leftist military experiments in Panama under Omar Torrijos and Peru under Velasco Alvarado (López Maya 2003). Initially, the MBR-200 had served as a study group to discuss contemporary problems in Venezuelan politics (Gott 2005). After the traumatic events of Caracazo in 1989, when President Carlos Andrés Pérez used the military to violently suppress the urban riots in response to the austerity measures, the organization evolved into a conspiracy among mid-level soldiers to overthrow the democratically elected government (Romonet 2013). The plot was finally executed on February 4, 1992, when a group of soldiers led by then Lieutenant Colonel Chávez attempted to capture President Pérez and take control of the command of the armed forces. The rebellion failed to achieve its goal especially in the capital city and Chávez called his compatriots to surrender on live television, por ahora (for now) to avoid further bloodshed (Romonet 2013). In his 50-second por ahora speech, Chávez assumed personal responsibility for the failure of the rebellion, giving him national recognition as a young soldier who dared to challenge the existing political class (Hellinger 2003). Even though his plans fell through, Chávez managed to capture the popular discontent towards the crumbling political system and promised hope for the future. Consequently, the myth of Chávez was born in the collective imagination of Venezuelans as an outsider whom they could identify with (López Maya 2003).
Throughout his political career, Chávez recognized the symbolic importance of “the civic-military uprising of the 4F,” as a day that started a new era and opened the path for his presidency (Episodes #57 and 246). In October 2010, he said: “I was born on the 4th of February. One is born multiple times in life” (Episode #365). The symbolism around the 4F dominated Chávez’s populist narrative as it was later converted into “the Day of National Dignity” and has been celebrated annually by his followers (Ribas 2018). Other examples that glorify the 1992 coup attempt include adding 4F to the name of the military barrack that Chávez used during the rebellion and opening “the 4F Square” nearby. Currently, Chávez’s body lies in “the 4F Museum” at the barrack, a further illustration of its symbolic importance as a refoundational event for the populist movement. In Turkey and Ecuador, this is comparable to the glorification of the July 15, 2016, coup attempt and the September 30, 2010, police rebellion respectively.
After the coup attempt, Chávez spent two years in prison, where he continued to operate behind bars with fellow members of the MBR-200. While Chávez was in prison, another failed military coup took place in November 1992 organized by soldiers who were sympathetic to the Bolivarian cause (Agüero 1995). In the first episode of Aló Presidente, Chávez talked favorably of the second coup attempt and the popular protests known as El Cacerolazo, in the form of banging pots and pans, blackouts, and making loud noises (Episode #1). As the existing political actors were in crisis, in 1993, President Pérez was impeached on corruption charges (Lalander 2010). In 1994, the new President Rafael Caldera, pardoned the members of the military who were involved in the two coup attempts (McCoy and Smith 1995). Subsequently, Chávez left prison with significant name recognition and, like Erdoğan, an inclusionary narrative of suffering for the people against the powerful establishment.
According to Chávez, his election to the presidency in 1998 marked the birth of “the New Venezuela” that is rooted in the country’s “forgotten” history. Specifically, Chávez drew parallels with Bolívar, whom he saw as “the Liberator, spiritual leader, and fundamental leader of the peaceful and democratic Bolivarian Revolution” (Episode #22). Thus, the revolution symbolized “the return of Bolívar and his redemption flag” (Episode #1). Besides Bolívar, Chávez considered Ezequiel Zamora and Simón Rodríguez as the remaining pillars of the Bolivarian ideology (Episode #57). Other than these three historical figures, throughout his time in office, Chávez praised a long list of Venezuelans, Latin American revolutionaries, and world leaders who had inspired his thinking: Fidel Castro, Augusto César Sandino, Emiliano Zapata, Cipriano Castro, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, Túpac Amaru, Jacobo Árbenz, Juan Bosch, Mao Zedong, and Vladimir Lenin, among others (Episodes #36, 57, 211, 218, 274, and 344). Through his frequent references to these historical figures, Chávez aimed to revive “the lost causes” of the 19th and the 20th centuries and start a brand-new chapter in the new millennium. Akin to Erdoğan and Correa, the construction of a “New Venezuela” rested on inclusionary and visionary themes of “new homeland,” “new republic,” “new stage,” “new phase,” “new people,” “new political reality,” and “new society” (Episodes #43, 57, 120, and 295).
(excerpted from Chapter 4)